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Should a Motion in Limine or Similar
Preliminary Motion Made in the
Federal Court System Preserve Error on
Appeal Without a Contemporaneous
Objection?
Imagine the following scenario:
There exists a hotly contested civil dispute in a district court of
the United States. The defendant, anticipating his adversary's
introduction of damaging evidence at trial, files a motion in
limine' to exclude this evidence. The judge denies the motion and
the trial subsequently begins. When the evidence is admitted at
trial, the counsel for defendant fails to object to its admission,
perhaps due to his misunderstanding of the law in that district
or possibly due to neglect. Ultimately, a verdict is rendered for
the plaintiff. The defendant appeals the verdict on the ground
that the evidence should have been excluded because the court's
denial of Ins motion in limine was improper.
Was the motion in limine sufficient to preserve the error for
appeal, or was an objection required when the evidence was
introduced at trial?
It is not difficult to imagine this scenario, as it is occurring
with greater frequency in the federal court system. 2 Generally,
courts hold that if a party making the motion in limine chooses
not to testify at trial, thereby precluding the admission of the
disputed evidence, no error is preserved for appeal because the
evidence is not on the record. 3 However, where the evidence is
introduced, there is discord among the circuits regarding the ne-
I A motion in limme is a motion made by a party, prior to trial, seeking a protective
order to exclude evidence. See BLAcK's LAw DI iONARY 708 (5th ed. 1979).
2 Annotation, Modern Status of Rules As to Use of Motion in Limme or Similar
Preliminary Motion to Secure Exclusion of Prejudicial Evidence or Reference to Prejudicial
Matters, 63 A.L.R.3d 311 (1975).
3 See, e.g., Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 43 (1984) (in order to raise and
preserve for review a claim of improper impeachment by a prior conviction the defendant
must testify).
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cessity of an objection at trial after the demal of a motion in
limine. Six circuits have ruled on the issue. The "general rule"
among the Third,4 Seventh,5 and Ninth6 Circuits is that an objection
at trial is unnecessary after the demal of a motion in limine. These
circuits have been fairly, but not completely, consistent in their
approaches to this issue.7 The Fifth,8 Eighth,9 and Eleventh 0 Cir-
cuits require a contemporaneous objection. These general rules do
not provide continuity in and among the circuits but, rather, give
rise to a precarious pit of conjecture into which even the most
diligent counsel may fall.
The unsettled zone of speculation in which this area of the law
now resides creates a derivative dilemma. Once a motion in limine
is demed, the movant typically wishes to preserve the error for
appeal. This can be assured by making a contemporaneous objec-
tion when the opposition introduces the evidence. However, in an
effort to soften the impact of the evidence, the movant may desire
to testify to it on direct. 1 May the movant testify to the disputed
evidence on direct in an effort to soften its blow, or is he required
to await his adversary's introduction of the evidence, in order to
appeal its admission? Courts typically review as distinct cases those
where the district court demed the motion in limine and the non-
moving party offers the evidence at trial and those where the
movant, employing trial strategy, offers the disputed evidence after
the demal of his motion in limne.1
2
This Comment briefly reviews the trial strategy involved when
utilizing the motion in limme. It analyzes two problems plaguing
the use of the motion in limme. First, the conflict among the
circuits that have addressed the sufficiency of a motion in limine
to preserve error for appellate review is analyzed. 3 Second, the
4 See infra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
7 See, e.g., United States v. Traylor, 656 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1981).
8 See infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
,0 See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 66-86 and accompanying text.
': See Sheehy v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 631 F.2d 649, 652 (9th Cir. 1980).
" The Third (see infra notes 24-31 and accompanying text), Seventh (see infra notes
32-33 and accompanying text), and Ninth (see infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text)
Circuits are currently the only circuits that recogrze a motion in limine as sufficient in and
of itself to preserve the alleged error for appellate review. The Fifth (see infra notes 43-51
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discord among those circuits that have ruled on whether a movant
may offer the questioned evidence. and subsequently appeal is ad-
dressed. 14 Finally, a solution to the precarious status of the motion
in limne is offered.' 5
TRiup STRATEGY AND THE MOTION IN LmriirE
Black's Law Dictionary defines "in limine" as "on or at the
threshold; at the very beginning; prelimnarily "16 A motion in
limme is made by a party in an effort to exclude prejudicial
evidence from trial.' 7 This motion accomplishes two primary pur-
poses. First, the motion serves as a time-saving device, allowing
the parties to gain rulings on motions prior to trial. Second, the
motion reflects a deliberate consideration for the jury's perception
of the trial proceeding.18 This motion is made and decided before
the trial begins, outside the presence of the jury 19 It is commonly
recognized that once evidence is introduced at trial, the damage is
done and it is likely irrelevant that the court may subsequently
sustain a party's objection.20 It is difficult for a jury to ignore
what it has already heard, despite strict admonishment by the court.
In fact, objection to evidence in the jury's presence may only focus
their attention on it.21 If a motion in limine could preserve the
objection for appeal, then trial strategy would be simplified. The
attorney would not be required to object to the introduction of the
evidence at trial, and the risk of amplifying the impact of the
evidence is overcome. 22
and accompanying text), Eighth (see infra notes 52-59 and accompanying text), and Eleventh
(see mfra notes 60-65 and accompanying text) Circuits require a contemporaneous objection
to preserve error for appellate review.
" See infra notes 66-86 and accompanying text.
"5 See infra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
16 BLAcx's LAW DxcnioN~AY 708 (5th ed. 1979).
17 See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984).
11 Annotation, Sufficiency in Federal Court of Motion in Limine to Preserve for
Appeal Objection to Evidence Absent Contemporary Objection at Trial, 76 A.L.R. FED.
619, 622 (1986).
11 Id. at 622.
2 Modem Status of Rules As to Use of Motion in Limme or Similar Preliminary
Motion to Secure Exclusion of Prejudicial Evidence or Reference to Prejudicial Matters,
supra note 2, at 313.
21 Id.
22 Id.
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I. CASES WiIERE DISPUTED EVIDENCE WAS INTRODUCED By AN
INDIVIDUAL OTHER THAN MOVANT AND MOVANT FAILED TO
OBJECT
A. Decisions in Circuits That Require No Contemporaneous
Objections
The Third, Seventh, and Ninth are the only circuits that have
recognized a motion in limine as sufficient in and of itself to
preserve the alleged error of a pre-tnal evidentiary ruling, without
a contemporaneous objection at trial.2
In 1985, the Third Circuit decided American Home Assurance
Co. v Sunshine Supermarket, Inc.2 In that case, an insurer filed
suit seeking a declaration that it was not liable under a fire insur-
ance policy. The insurer's motion in limine, requesting that evi-
dence of arson be excluded, was denied by the court.25 Subsequently,
the insurer failed to object when the evidence was admitted at
trial.26 The court, reading Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a) (here-
inafter "Rule 103")27 m conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 46 (hereinafter "Rule 46"),28 found that under the cir-
cumstances a contemporaneous objection would have been in the
nature of a formal exception, which is unnecessary under Rule
23 See infra notes 24-41 and accompanying text.
2 753 F.2d 321 (3d Cir. 1985).
2 Id. at 324.
26 Id.
- FED. R. EviD. 103(a)(1) provides in relevant part:
Rule 103. RULINGS ON EVIDENCE
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling
wich admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground if
objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context.
Fa. R. Civ P 46 provides m full:
Rule 46. EXCEPTIONS UNNECESSARY
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary; but for
all purposes for which an exception has heretofore been necessary it is suffi-
cient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or
sought, makes known to the court the action which the party desires the court
to take or the party's objection to the action of the court and the grounds
therefor; and, if a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at
the time it is made, the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice
the party.
[VoL. 79
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46.29 The court reasoned that the district court's pre-trial ruling
was a definitive oral ruling with no suggestion that it would be
reconsidered at trial. An objection at trial would have been super-
fluous. 30 In the two cases presenting the issue to the Third Circuit
since American Home, the court has held steadfastly to its opinion
that a motion in limme preserves error for appellate review without
an objection at trial.
31
In Thronson v. Meisels, the Seventh Circuit articulated its
general rule that an unsuccessful attempt to exclude certain evi-
dence through a motion in limine is enough to preserve the issue
for appeal. 32 The court unqualifiedly held that the pre-trial motion
satisfied the timely objection requirement of Rule 103.
33
In 1981, the Ninth Circuit first decided the sufficiency of a
motion in limine as a basis for appellate review In United States
v Traylor,34 the court held that an objection at trial must be made
to preserve error for review and that the denial of a party's motion
in limine is an insufficient substitute. 35 However, although Traylor
has not been expressly overruled by the Ninth Circuit, the opinion
has been abandoned and overshadowed by the court's later deci-
sions. In adopting the approaches of Sheehy v. Southern Pac.
Transp. Co. 36 and American Home, 37 the Ninth Circuit in, Palmerin
v City of Riverside38 rejected the "invariable requirement that an
" American Home Assurance Co. v. Sunshine Supermarket, Inc., 753 F.2d 321, 324
(3d Cir, 1985) ("Rule 103(a), however, must be read in conjunction with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 46 which states that formal exceptions are unnecessary.").
30 Id. ("[Tihe test is whether an objection at trial would have been more in the nature
of a formal exception or in the nature of a timely objection calling the court's attention to
a matter it need consider.").
31 See Carden v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 850 F.2d 996, 1001 n.5 (3d Cir. 1988)
("The district court denied Westinghouse's motion and ruled that the evidence was adnms-
sible at the same time assuring counsel for Westinghouse that her objection was preserved.");
United States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 952 n.19 (3d Cir. 1986) ("The requirement that
an objection be properly raised at trial, however, is not a rigid, mechanical rule blind to
valid claims properly raised in pre- or post-trial proceedings.").
32 800 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1986).
31 Id. at 142 ("By seeking, albeit unsuccessfully, to exclude the evidence by filing a
motion in limine the Meiselses have sufficiently preserved the issue for appeal."); see also
Hams v. Davis, 874 F.2d 461 (7th Cir. 1989) (In suit by prison inmate alleging cruel and
unusual punishment, error was preserved through his motion m limne though he failed to
object at trial to the admission of evidence regarding disciplinary action.).
- 656 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1981).
31 Id. at 1333 n.6.
- 631 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1980).
37 753 F.2d at 324-25.
- 794 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1986).
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objection that is the subject of an unsuccessful motion in limine
must be renewed at tnal. '3 9 The court further stated:
The substance of the objection to the adrmssion of the guilty
pleas was thoroughly explored during the hearing on the motion
in limine There was no hint that the ruling might be subject
to reconsideration. Perhaps most important, there was nothing m
the manner or context in which the guilty pleas were introduced
at trial that was unforeseen or that cast any doubt on the appli-
cability of the trial court's in limine rulingA°
Therefore, it appeared to be significant to the court that the
evidence offered at trial mirrored the evidence discussed in limine.
In its decisions subsequent to Palmerin, the Ninth Circuit has
reaffirmed its opinion that the denial of a motion in limine pre-
serves error for appellate review 41 The Palmerin decision now
represents the general rule within that circuit.
B. Decisions in Circuits That Require Contemporaneous
Objections
The Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits require a contempo-
raneous objection at trial to preserve error for appellate review
after the denial of a motion in limine.42
In Collins v Wayne Corp.,43 the Fifth Circuit articulated what
has become the general view of that circuit, that a party who fails
to object at trial may not challenge the admission of the evidence
on appeal." The court qualified its opinion by stating that motions
in limine are frequently hypothetical and abstract, in anticipation
of some unknown circumstance that may never develop at trial. If
a party were to file numerous motions in limine, the court may
39 Id. at 1413.
40 Id.
41 See United States v. Scott, 859 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1988) (Although agreeing with
its Palmerin decision, the court found that the motion in limine was insufficiently explored
to preserve error for appellate review.); Landes Constr. Co. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 833
F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987) ("As long as a party properly raises an issue of law before
the case goes to the jury, it need not include the issue in a motion for a directed verdict m
order to preserve the question on appeal."); United States v. 57.09 Acres of Land, More
or Less, Etc., 757 F.2d I025 (9th Cir. 1985) (Where the government objected to the court's
allowing the jury to hear evidence regarding lease renewal and income, additional objections
were unnecessary.).
42 See infra notes 43-65 and accompanying text.
43 621 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1980).
" Id. at 784.
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not pay close attention to each one.45 It is necessary that the party
object when the evidence sought to be excluded is about to be
introduced so that the court may reconsider its pre-trial ruling in
light of actual, rather than hypothetical, circumstances.46
In an expansive discussion of the issue, the Fifth Circuit stated:
Demal of a motion m limine rarely imposes a serious hardship
on the requesting party, since the affected party can make a
subsequent objection if the evidence is ever offered at trial. That
later objection is the better time to evaluate the possible exclusion
of testimony because it is at that time that the claims of prejudice
and irrelevance move out of the abstract context of a motion in
limne into the real world of an actual speaker and a specific
statement. 47
Although the Fifth Circuit generally requires an objection at
trial to preserve an appeal, it does recogmze an exception. In Reyes
v Missouri Pac. R.R. Co.,48 the court stated than an objection
must be made at trial, unless there exists a good reason not to do
so. 49 In Reyes such a reason existed-a valid trial strategy of
introducing the evidence to the jury on direct examination in an
attempt to soften the blow of damaging information. 50 However,
in a subsequent case, the court found that no valid reason for the
plaintiffs' failure to object to the adnussion of evidence at trial
existed because the plaintiff made no showing of good cause for
not renewing the initial objection.5'
Perhaps the Eighth Circuit is the most prolific with regard to
decisions on whether demal of a pre-trial, ruling is sufficient to
preserve error for appellate review 52 The Circuit first reviewed this
45 Id.
46 Id. ("Motions in limine are frequently made in the abstract and in anticipation of
some hypothetical circumstance that may not develop at trial.").
41 Rojas v. Richardson, 703 F.2d 186, 188 (5th Cir. 1983).
"4 589 F.2d 791, 793 n.2 (5th Cir. 1979); see infra note 79 and accompanying text.
49 Id. at 793.
" Id. (Plaintiff's motion in limine to exclude evidence preserved the issue for appeal
when he presented the disputed evidence to the jury during trial.).
11 Rojas v. Richardson, 703 F.2d 186, 188 (5th Cir. 1983) (prior to trial, plaintiff
unsuccessfully sought to exclude the use of the term "illegal alien"; for no apparent reason,
plaintiff failed to object when the term was used by defendant's counsel during his closing
argument).
12 See, e.g., United States v. Neumann, 867 F.2d 1102, 1105 (8th Cir. 1989) (defendant
failed to preserve for appeal his objection to evidence seized in a search, although he
objected to the search and seizure in a pre-trial motion, where he failed to object to the
admission of the evidence during trial); United States v. Kandiel, 865 F.2d 967, 972 (8th
1990-91]
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issue in'1982, when it decided Northwestern Flyers, Inc. v. Olson
Bros. Mfg.53 Citing a Fifth Circuit decision, 4 the court found that
when a defendant insurance company failed to interpose an objec-
tion at trial to evidence it sought to exclude prior to trial, it failed
to preserve the alleged error for review 55
In Hale v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 56 the court held that
not only must the objection be renewed at trial but the contem-
poraneous objection must be upon the same grounds as those upon
which the motion in limine was based. Prior to trial, Firestone
sought to exclude evidence of certain remarks as conclusory and
defamatory 57 However, when the motion in limine was renewed at
trial, Firestone objected to the remarks because they were hearsay 58
Firestone preserved only its hearsay objection because the objection
regarding the conclusory and defamatory character of the disputed
remarks was not renewed at trial.59
Despite the Eleventh Circuit's recent entry into the fray, it
appears that this circuit has developed a cogent general rule that
an objection is required at trial to preserve an issue for appeal.60
Cir. 1989) (appellant's objection to the admission of evidence regarding fingerprint cards in
a pre-trial motion did not preserve appeal without a contemporaneous objection); United
States v. Roemgk, 810 F.2d 809, 815 (8th Cir. 1987) (court of appeals reviewed disputed
evidence regarding tax chiseling and pollution by third party because defendant objected at
tnal in addition to objecting in his motion in limine); Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors
Corp., 771 F.2d 1112, 1118-19 (8th Cir. 1985) (Under special circumstances of tls case,
the court allowed an exception to its general rule and permitted motion in limine to preserve
error for appellate review because motion had been fully briefed and argued.); United States
v. Robertson, 706 F.2d 253, 255 n.2 (8th Cir. 1983) (defendant failed to preserve his
objection to trial court's admission of his prior conviction for purposes of impeachment
when he did not renew his objection at trial, despite lus effort to exclude the conviction in
his motion in limine); Starr v. J. Hacker Co., 688 F.2d 78, 81 (8th Cir. 1982) (In products
liability action for injuries caused by malfunctiomng stripper plate in a die set, plaintiff's
unsuccessful attempt, through his pre-trial motion, to exclude evidence of a third party's
duty to make the die safe did not preserve error without a contemporaneous objection.).
53 679 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1982) (following an airplane crash, financing agent sought
to exclude evidence of a federal regulation in a suit against buyer for the balance of certain
payments).
'4 Collins v. Wayne Corp., 62r F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1980).
51 Northwestern Flyers, Inc. v. Olson Bros. Mfg., 679 F.2d 1264, 1275 n.27 (8th Cir.
1982).
56 756 F.2d 1322, 1333-34 (8th Cir. 1985).
7 Id. at 1334.
58 Id.
59 Id.
See Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 1492, 1504 (11th Cir. 1985)
(In an asbestos action brought by workers against an asbestos manufacturer, the manufac-
turer's pre-trial motion to exclude evidence of cancer among workers did not preserve the
issue for appeal when there was no objection at trial as to the evidence.).
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In Hendrix v Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., the court found com-
pelling the fact that appellant had ample opportumty to object at
trial to the admission of the evidence he sought earlier to exclude.
61
The Eleventh Circuit subsequently adhered to its Hendrix opin-
ion m United States v Rutkowski.62 However, there exists one
disturbing case decided prior to Rutkowski but less than one month
after Hendrix.63 In United States v Kerr, the court found that the
defendant had objected at trial to the admission of evidence, but
in a footnote the court stated that even if the defendant had not
objected at trial, his objection to the evidence through his motion
in limine would have been sufficient to preserve the error for
appellate review" Because of the Eleventh Circuit's more recent
case following Hendrix,65 it is unlikely that its dicta in Kerr will
alter the course of its general rule. However, the inconsistency of
Kerr compels one to be aware of its existence.
II. CASES WHERE MOVANT INTRODUCES THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
When a party moves, prior to trial, to have certain evidence
excluded and the district court judge demes the motion, in many
instances the movant may be compelled to introduce the evidence
hmself." Although ostensibly it seems foolhardy for the movant
to unveil to the jury the very evidence he sought to exclude, it may
in fact make good sense in the exercise of trial strategy 67 When
the movant introduces the evidence he sought to exclude, he is in
a better position to nunnmze the effect it has upon the jury.6
Alternatively, in criminal proceedings, for example, the movant
may choose not to testify when he wishes at all costs to preclude
the introduction of the damaging testimony and it cannot be intro-
duced through anyone else. 69
" Id. at 1504.
814 F.2d 594, 598 (11th Cir. 1987) (defendant convicted of conspiracy to possess
cocaine with intent to distribute was demed an appeal to the admission of fuel log,
handwriting analysis, and expert testimony; although he objected to their admssion prior
to trial, he did not renew his objection).
United States v. Kerr, 778 F.2d 690 (11th Cir. 1985).
, Id. at 698 n.8 ("As a general rule, an objection to the admission of evidence made
through a motion in limine is preserved on appeal despite any failure to object to the
evidence at trial, assuming that the trial court treated the motion in detail.").
63 United States v. Rutkowski, 814 F.2d 594, 598 (11th Cir. 1987).
" See Reyes v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 589 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1979).
67 Id. at 793 n.2.
"Id.
9 Currently the circuits that have ruled on this issue are in complete agreement that
1990-91]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
A split in authority exists among the circuits with regard to the
preservation of error when the movant, whose motion in limine
was denied, introduces the evidence at trial. The Eighth Circuit
currently is the only circuit that precludes a movant's right to
appeal the denial of his pre-trial motion when he introduces the
evidence he previously sought to exclude. It has held steadfastly to
this rule, which it first articulated in United States v Cobb. 70 In
Cobb, the movant introduced evidence of a prior conviction on
direct examination, although he had tried unsuccessfully to have
that evidence excluded prior to trial through his motion in limine.
7'
The court found that the movant waived his right to appeal the
denial of his motion, stating that the motion in limine is tentative,
and the appeal is conditioned upon the court's ruling on the
evidence in light of the facts and circumstances developed at trial.
7 2
The court is necessarily precluded from ruling when the party
seeking to exclude the evidence introduces it because the presenting
party cannot object.73 The court opined that the defendant "effec-
tively cut off both the prosecutor's privilege to withhold the pos-
sibly prejudicial evidence and the court's opportunity to reconsider
its preliminary ruling by voluntarily broaching the subject of the
conviction on direct examination. ' 74 This rule has withstood the
test of time in the Eighth Circuit, and subsequent decisions dem-
onstrate that the Eighth Circuit will not allow a motion in limine
to preserve error without an objection at trial.75
The Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have held a motion in
limine adequate to preserve error for appeal, even where the mov-
a party's decision not to take the stand precludes lum from challenging the trial court's
denial of his motion in limine to exclude certain evidence. See, e.g., Virgin Islands v.
Brathwaite, 782 F.2d 399 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Studnicka, 777 F.2d 652 (lth
Cir. 1985); United States v. Wolfe, 766 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1985).
70 588 F.2d 607, 612-13 (8th Cir. 1978).
71 Id. at 613.
72 Id. at 612.
73 Id. at 613.
74 Id.
71 See, e.g., United States v. Dahlin, 734 F.2d 393, 396 (8th Cir. 1984) (disclosure in
defense counsel's opemng statements of defendant's prior conviction was deemed a waiver
of appeal of defendant's unsuccessful attempt to exclude conviction prior to trial); United
States v. Johnson, 720 F.2d 519 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1036 (1984)
(defendant who made motion in limine to preclude direct examination on the basis of
certain prior criminal convictions but who did not object when prosecutor sought to
introduce the evidence to impeach defendant failed to preserve the issue for review); United
States v. Key, 717 F.2d 1206 (8th Cir. 1983) (defendant's testimony on direct examination
of prior convictions prevented defendant's alleging error on advance ruling by court re-
garding the admissibility of evidence).
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ant offers the disputed evidence at trial.76 Each of these circuits
has relied principally upon Rule 103, which requires that a timely
objection to the admission of evidence be made to preserve the
issue for appeal.77 Because of the precarious position the demal of
a motion in limine creates for the movant, these circuits have
found Rule 103's timely objection requirement is satisfied by the
motion in limine without an objection at trial .
7
In Reyes v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., the Fifth Circuit was
deeply disturbed by the defendant's unenviable position. "[Hie had
no choice but to elicit [the] information on direct examination in
an effort to ameliorate its prejudicial effect. ' 79 The Seventh Circuit
also was plagued by these concerns.80 Relying upon Rule 103, the
court found that when a movant's motion in limine to exclude
records was denied, ins placing the entire contents of those records
into evidence did not preclude his right to appeal, the issue .8 In
direct contradiction of Cobb, the Seventh Circuit stated that the
movant is entitled to treat the ruling on the pre-tnal motion as the
law of the case so that admission of the evidence he sought to
exclude is not a waiver of his right to appeal the ruling. 2 The
Ninth Circuit employed a rationale similar to that employed by the
Fifth and Seventh Circuits when ruling on the movant's preserva-
tion of error. 3
One district court has ruled upon this issue.84 In United States
v. Muscato, the Eastern District of New York held that the defen-
dant was entitled to rely on his motion in limine, and his intro-
duction of the testimony in question on cross-examination did not
preclude his right to appeal.85 Relying on Rule 103 and the Reyes
decision, the court, stated, "[a] timely and specific objection in
limine never withdrawn sufficiently preserves the issue.
' 's6
76 See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
" American Home Assurance Co. v. Sunshine Supermarket, Inc., 753 F.2d 321, 324
(3d Cir. 1985); see supra text accompanying note 30.
71 See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
7' 589 F.2d at 793 n.2.
10 See Cook v. Hoppin, 783 F.2d 684, 691 n.2 (7th Cir. 1986).
" Id.
"Id.
13 See Sheehy v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 631 F.2d 649, 652, 653 (9th Cir. 1980).
- United States v. Muscato, 534 F Supp. 969 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
" Id. at.973.
" Id.
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TBE BENEFITS OF A GENERAL RULE
The unsettled law that exists among the circuits m the federal
court system and the inconsistencies within those circuits create an
arena of speculation into which counsel for the movant is forced
to enter . 7 Such an arena may be fraught with disastrous conse-
quences if the movant's attorney is unfamiliar with all of the rulings
in the circuit or is unable to predict with accuracy how the circuit
will rule in its next opinion. Counsel treads on especially dangerous
ground in those circuits that have not yet decided this issue, where
no amount of research will indicate in which direction the circuit
will rule.
One might ask why a general rule is required with regard to
this issue while so many other facets of the law remain unsettled
in the federal circuits. Quite simply, the repercussions may be
calamitous for the movant and his attorney if the attorney nispre-
dicts or misunderstands a given circuit's rulings on the sufficiency
of a motion in lmine's ability to preserve an error for appeal. For
example, if in a given case in the Ninth Circuit, counsel for the
movant were to rely on that circuit's most recent opinions foregoing
the necessity of an objection at trial88 and make no contempora-
neous objection, he would be precluding his client's right to appeal
the specific -issue if the court chose to rely on Traylor,"9 which
requires an objection at trial. It is not difficult to understand the
catastrophe that the foreclosure of an appeal may mean for the
client or the potential malpractice liability for the well-meaning, or
even negligent, attorney
The primary benefit of a general rule is predictability The rule
serves to inform the parties and the court as to the status of the
motion in limine and whether there is a need for a renewed objec-
tion. Much of the guesswork and even deliberate, well-researched
predictions made by the movant's counsel are eliminated in favor
of an enlightened proceeding with nummal risks to the client.
Adherence to the philosophy behind the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (hereinafter "Federal Rules") requires conformity among
the circuits regarding this issue. In enacting the Process Act of
1789, a forebearer to the Federal Rules, it was Congress' intent
87 See supra notes 26-86 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
0 United States v. Traylor, 656 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1981).
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"to create uniformity of procedure within each state.'"'9 A general
rule with regard to the status of the motion in limine would be
consistent with the purpose behind the Federal Rules. Furthermore,
it is in the public interest that there be. uniformity of procedure
among the appellate courts. 91 This uniformity can "only come from
concerted action, not from intermittent changes in individual circuit
rules." 92 It is necessary that there be cohesion and predictability
of procedure among the circuits in deciding the impact of a denial
of a motion in limine, and a general rule would provide those
benefits.
Repeated objections in the presence of the jury, when a motion
in limine would suffice, oftentimes serve only to draw excessive
attention to the offending evidence. 93 It is generally understood
that it is imperative to keep objections to a minmum:
Often your objection will serve to call special attention of the
jury as well as the court to the unfavorable evidence you seek to
exclude, thus tending to emphasize its significance. Natural cun-
osity will cause a juror to speculate privately and perhaps also to
share the speculations with other jurors regarding the excluded
matter. Frequently the question will have given enough of a clue
that jurors surmise the nature *of the excluded evidence. They
may even surmise something worse than the excluded evidence.
9
4
Additionally, if the attorney has made numerous motions prior to
trial to exclude certain evidence and is then forced to renew his
objections at trial, it is possible that he may forego some valid
objections out of legitimate concern for the perceptions of the
jury 95
9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIvIL § 2471
(1971) (citations omitted) ("If the court takes action contrary to that requested by a party
or overrules his objection, it is no longer necessary for the lawyer to go through the ritual
of noting his exception T]o do so is unnecessary and may even be improper."); see
also Amencan Home Assurance Co. v. Sunshine Supermarket, Inc., 753 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.
1985) ("Under these circumstances [the court having given no indication that its pre-trial
oral ruling would be reconsidered at trial], requiring an objection when the evidence was
introduced at trial would have been in the nature of a formal exception and, thus, unnec-
essary under Rule 46.").
91 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILER, E. CooPER & E. GRnssmA, FmmAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3945 (1977).
92 Id.
11 Annotation, supra note 2, at 313.
R. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS 167 (1973).
" See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
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A consistent rule with regard to the sufficiency of a motion in
limme to preserve error for appellate review also would resolve the
dilemma in those cases where the movant testifies to the disputed
evidence.9 The decision of whether or not a client is to testify is
a very serious one. It is necessary that the party making the decision
be apprised of all of the necessary facts in order to make a fully
informed decision. A general rule would supply the needed infor-
mation.
Furthermore, the objections made at trial would be reduced to
a rmnmum by a general rule. Only very necessary objections need
be made by the movant at trial, which reduces the length and
complexity of the trial. It is also unlikely that an attorney repre-
senting the movant will forget or neglect to object at trial in those
instances when he has been specifically forewarned by the court
that it is necessary to do so. The moving party is apprised of
exactly what actions must be taken to preserve the issue for appeal.
When the movant considers introducing evidence he sought
earlier to exclude, he is relieved of the burden of deciding whether
to mitigate the impact by introducing it himself or assure the
preservation of his appeal by letting the opposition introduce the
evidence. A general rule would allow the movant to introduce the
evidence and to preserve the issue for appeal. Finally, when a party
is deciding whether or not he should offer the evidence, he may
do so without conjecture, weighing the pros and cons of his testi-
mony The movant may determine the impact of the evidence to
the greatest extent possible, eliminating unnecessary supposition.
A GENERAL RuLE
Ostensibly it would appear that a rule requiring in all instances
an objection during trial to preserve error for appellate review
should be required. However, such an arrangement would circum-
vent Rule 46's elimination of the exception as a necessity for
appellate review 97 A rigid rule that demands an objection at trial
when a motion in limine has been denied, regardless of the motion's
substance or its exploration by the court, would be in the nature
of an exception and contrary to the purpose of Rule 46, which is
to abolish burdensome formalities.98 Neither would a general rule
91 See supra notes 66-85 and accompanying text.
17 See supra note 28.
" 9' C. WRIuoT & A. MIER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIviL § 2471
(1971).
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be workable that mandates that all pre-tnal motions to exclude
evidence preserve error for appellate review This system would
deprive a trial judge of ins discretion to require an objection in
those instances where the motion in limine is vague or undefined.
In those cases, Rule 103's requirement of a timely objection would
be circumvented were the judge not allowed to require a specific
objection."
For the foregoing reasons, the articulation of a consistent rule
is required in the federal court system. The circuits typically have
cited to the specificity of the motion and the depth of its explo-
ration by the trial court when deternumng whether a renewed
objection is, required when a motion in limine has been demed.100
The thoroughness of a pre-trial motion, however, is entirely too
subjective an indicium upon which to base a general rule. The
divisiveness among the circuits on this issue indicates that what
one court may deem sufficiently explicit in a pre-trial motion,
another court may deem insufficient.' 0 For counsel to predict a
given circuit's determination as to the explicitness of a pre-tnal
motion is to require telepathic powers.
Quite simply, the nussing link in this dilemma is commumca-
tion. Because a flat per se rule among the circuits is unworkable
and likely violative of the Federal Rules,c 2 an "informed disum-
formity" among the circuits is the only valid solution. Inclusive in
the pre-trial proceeding should be a determination by the court as
to the specificity of the motion in limme and whether a renewed
objection is required to preserve the issue for appeal. This deter-
nunation should then be commumcated to all parties to the action.
See supra note 27.
See, e.g., Palmenn v. City of Riverside, 794 F.2d 1409, 1413 (9th Cir. 1986)
("[W]here the substance of an objection has been thoroughly explored during the hearing
on the motion in ilmine, and the trial court's ruling permitting introduction of evidence
was explicit and definitive, no further action is required to preserve for appeal the issue of
admissibility of that evidence."); Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112,
1118-19 (8th Cir. 1985) ("It was not a typical motion in limme situation where a hypothetical
question is posed whose nature and relevance is unclear before trial. The matter was fully
briefed and argued.").
1*1 Compare United States v. 57.09 Acres of Land, More or Less, Etc., 757 F.2d 1025,
1027 (9th Cir. 1985) (where government's objection to testimony and jury instructions in a
pre-trial hearing preserved its right to appeal these issues without an objection at trial) with
Collins v. Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777, 783-84 (5th Cir. 1980) (where the party was demed
its motion in limine to prevent cross-examination of certain witnesses and then neglected to
object during the cross-examnnation at trial, the party was -precluded from appealing this
issue).
112 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
1990-91]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
This process lends predictability to the specific proceeding and
eliminates much of the risky guesswork. The movant is fully in-
formed as to the necessity of objecting at trial and contempora-
neous objections are kept to a nummum. If an attorney fails to
object after having been warned by the court, he may not complain
on appeal. The judge's discretion regarding the necessity of a
contemporaneous objection should be treated by the appellate court
as a finding of fact and accorded the same high degree of defer-
ence. Although this rule of pre-trial communication will be uniform
among the circuits, the determination of whether an objection at
trial is needed is within the discretion of each trial judge and thus
the "informed disuniformity."
The issue of whether a motion in limine preserves error for
review likely will be resolved only through an amendment to the
Federal Rules. Currently, courts are struggling with the contradic-
tory implications of Rule 103's timely objection requirement and
Rule 46's elimination of the exception.13 A definitive rule requiring
a judge to evaluate a pre-trial motion's validity to preserve error
and to communicate Ins determination to the parties prior to trial
would eliminate many of the confused and misguided interpreta-
tions existing in the. federal circuits today
With regard to evidence offered by the movant to which he
objected prior to trial, the moving party should be permitted an
appeal. The precarious position into which a movant is placed
under the circumstances compels such a rule. °4 Currently in the
Eighth Circuit, for example, a party whose motion in limine has
been demed must decide either to introduce the evidence in the
least prejudicial manner and forego his appeal, or allow the op-
posing party to introduce the evidence and thereby preserve his
appeal. 0 15 It is clearly an unnecessary dilemma and one that is
easily remedied if the movant is allowed to introduce his evidence
and simultaneously preserve'his appeal.1°' This general rule does
not require the moving party to alert the court during the pre-trial
proceeding as to the sufficiency of the pre-trial motion to preserve
the error. The concession is afforded automatically to the party if
and when he chooses to introduce the evidence.
103 See supra notes 27-29.
-o 'See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
101 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 720 F.2d 519 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1036 (1984).
106 See supra notes 77-83.
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CONCLUSION
Currently, the federal circuits are in a state of flux, with some
circuits finding a motion in limme sufficient to preserve an issue
for appeal,107 while others do not.13 Within these circuits, courts
often analyze the sufficiency of the motion in terms of its specificity
and depth of exploration by the trial court.3 9 Clearly, these sub-
jective distinctions are inconsistent with the best interests of the
parties to the action and the public at large.
The differences among the circuits illustrate the need for a
coherent rule in the federal court system. Essentially, if the evidence
the movant seeks unsuccessfully to exclude prior to trial is to be
offered by his opponent, the court has discretion to require a
renewed objection to preserve the issue for appeal. If it does so
require, this must be communicated to both parties. If the evidence
is to be admitted by the movant, then the court has no discretion
and the movant is always permitted an appeal.
A general rule that lends consistent treatment to the status of
the motion in limine creates an informed atmosphere in wich to
practice law. Communication prior to trial, between the court and
the parties, helps to eliminate some of the unnecessary risk and
guesswork that has become increasingly inherent to appellate prac-
tice.
Catherine Murr Young
107 See supra notes 26-41 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 43-65 and accompanying text.
,09 See supra note 100.
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